Introduction
Various theoretical issues connected with the importance of context, context sensitivity and context relativity figure prominently in the current debates within pragmatics and philosophy, especially epistemology and the philosophy of language. It may be claimed (albeit somewhat subjectively) that the foundations for different aspects of this debate were laid down by Frege's context principle, Wittgenstein's remarks on meaning as use, and Grice's Modified Occam's Razor.
In his study on the origins of analytical philosophy, Dummett (1993: 5) points to Frege's early work as seminal not only for this movement, but also for the very development of the linguistic turn. The relevant fragment, introducing the context principle, is to be found in §62 of Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, where Frege claims that "it is only in the context of a proposition that words have any meaning" (Frege [1884] : 73). Dummett (1993: 3) observes that the context principle is "formulated as one governing an enquiry into language rather than into modes of thought", which is connected with the linguistic turn in philosophy. Frege's principle underlies also the linguistic turn in epistemology, where knowledge The second source relevant for the debate mentioned above is §43 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: "For a large class of cases -though not for all -in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language". Though Wittgenstein's reflections on meaning have generated a plethora of competing interpretations (and misinterpretations), they have unambiguously put the context of use in the focus of linguistic and philosophical research.
Finally, Grice's Modified Occam's Razor, "Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity" (Grice 1978 (Grice /1989 , understood as a pragmatic regulative principle, stresses the need to restrict possible interpretations.
The present special issue of Lodz Papers in Pragmatics brings together various perspectives on context and contextualism, revisiting its main tenets of context sensitivity and knowledge attribution, and reflecting the ongoing theoretical debates, both within contextualism itself and other competing theories.
Contextualism
In his Truth-Conditional Pragmatics Recanati (2010: 33) describes a contextualist as someone who "generalizes context sensitivity", while acknowledging, at the same time, that for others (e.g. Cappelen and Lepore) the very acceptance of context sensitivity would be a sufficient condition to claim this label. Despite its established position in the philosophy of language, the contextualist framework is far from uniform, with clearly delineated boundaries, especially when we consider the ongoing debates with invariantism, minimalism or, more recently, contrastivism. Various classifications of degrees of radicalism within the paradigm, for example TCP and Radical Contextualism as distinguisted by Recanati (2010) , moderate contextualism in the form of indexicalism, radical contextualism, and non-indexical contextualism, as proposed by Bianchi (2010) , subject contextualism vs. attributor contextualism (DeRose 2009), testify to contextualism's diverse nature and potential for theoretical expansion. Ludlow (2008) , for example, provides a set of strategies for "executing" the framework, "ranging from implicit L-marking to cheap contextualism". At the same time, as new rival theories have come to the scene, contextualism has been struggling to defend its theoretical integrity and its difference from "other" approaches.
Contextualists have also drawn their inspiration from Waismann's (1940) notion of open texture, and Austin's work (1961) .The idea that sentences are truthevaluable only in the context of a speech act, developed by ordinary language philosophers like Searle (1979 and later work) , Travis (1975 and later work) Recanati (1993, 2004, 2005) , has had a significant bearing on subsequent theoretical debates concerning "the characterisation of explicit and implicit content, the decoding/inferring distinction and the semantics/pragmatics interface" (Bianchi 2010: 3) in post-Gricean pragmatics, where the contextualist view has also been embraced by Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995) and default semantics, a more radical contextualist approach (Jaszczolt 2005) . As pointed out by Jaszczolt (2010: 332) , " [o] ther new aspects of post-Gricean contextualism include debates about the unit on which pragmatic processes operate, where views range from Grice's original proposition-based (thoughtbased), 'global' inference (Jaszczolt 2005) to very 'local', sometimes even wordor morpheme-based inference (Levinson 2000 
Contents of the volume
The opening paper, Tamara Dobler's "Two Conceptions of Wittgenstein's Contextualism", sets the scene and provides historical background to contemporary theoretical disputes between contextualism and its invariantist competitors. The author discusses two interpretations of Wittgenstein's claims regarding "meaning as use" (as introduced in Wittgenstein 1953, §43), viz. meaning-eliminativism (Conat 1998) and meaning-underdetermination (Travis 1989 (Travis , 2006 . The former, set within the context of the discussion focused on Wittgenstein's conception of nonsense, argues against occasion-insensitive meaning and the possibility that language can be understood in isolation from its use. According to Dobler, such an interpretation is "at odds with Wittgenstein's view of linguistic understanding, which allows for different understandings of what it means to understand language". Hence, the author tries to demonstrate that the latter view, which does not deny meaning to words outside the immediate context of use, is a more plausible interpretation of Wittgenstein's claim. While doing so, Dobler elucidates on the concept of language games, postulating to treat them "as a methodological device used to clarify particular aspects of our actual language use, rather than involving a claim about natural language semantics".
Filippo Domaneschi, in "Presuppositions and Appropriateness of Assertions", examines two theoretical approaches to pragmatic presuppositions: Common Ground account (Stalnaker 2002) and Propositional Context account (Gauker 2002 (Gauker , 2008 . Critiquing the former view for, firstly, the assumption that to presuppose a proposition speakers have to accept it as true (which, as he points out, is not always the case), and, secondly, the lack of a criterion allowing to distinguish between propositions that are assumed and presupposed, the author 184 Piotr Stalmaszczyk & Monika Kopytowska Perspectives on Context and Contextualism demonstrates the theoretical advantage of Gauker's approach. Yet, as Domaneschi argues, even this view, with its objective criterion as to what speakers ought to share, is still not in a position to account for various contextually-conditioned ways in which propositions can be taken for granted by the speakers. In his attempt to address this "theoretical incapacity", the author refers to epistemic contextualism and its claims regarding justification (Annis 1978 , DeRose 1999 , Sosa and Villanueva 2000 . This allows him to demonstrate that various ways of sharing presuppositions play a vital role in determining the appropriateness of assertions and to offer an enrichment to Gauker's model, in the form of a further condition for appropriateness of assertion which states that: "in order to appropriately assert a sentence p that requires a presupposition q, speakers ought to recognize how they should justify q in a specific communicative context".
The third contribution, "How Moderate Relativists Should Explain the Appearance of Disagreements about Taste", by Sanna Hirvonen, challenges the way in which non-indexical contextualism accounts for the emergence of the disagreements of taste. Showing that there are no grounds for interring pragmatic data (the appearance of disagreement) from formal semantics (assigning truth conditions to circumstance), the author suggests approaching the relativist framework from the perspective of mental representation. Discussing the status of circumstances of evaluation and content, and the implications of attributing an element to either of them, Hirvonen raises important questions as to the nature of language use and understanding and doubts as to its interpretation by semantic relativists.
Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska, in "The Agreement-Based Tests for Context Sensitivity", discusses Cappelen and Lepore's semantic minimalism and the context sensitivity tests, which appeal to "says-that" reports. Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009) criticize those tests and propose agreement-based tests instead. Odrowąż-Sypniewska challenges the validity of agreement and disagreement tests in assessing context sensitivity, claiming that the results they provide are determined by the prior theoretical standpoint.
Erich H. Rast's "Nonindexical Context-Dependence and the Interpretation as Abduction Approach" is another contribution to the discussion on contextsensitivity and its formal representation. The author argues that the processes of free and lexically modelled enrichment underlying utterance interpretation can be modelled as an abductive inference. His apparatus, with its potential to be "used to model the contextual resolution of context-dependent or semantically incomplete utterances", turns out to be an important theoretical step in an attempt to bridge the gap between semantics and pragmatics in their accounts of inclusive contextdependence.
The In the penultimate article, "Contextualism, Pragmatics and Definite Descriptions", Massimiliano Vignolo expounds on the nature of definite descriptions and theoretical disagreements concerning their attributive and referential uses. The author makes an attempt to situate and evaluate the contextualist account of definite descriptions against the background of contrasting views within Ambiguity Theory and Implicature Theory, with the former granting and the latter denying an ambiguous status to them. He demonstrates that both Recanati and Bezuidehnout, propounding that definite descriptions are semantically underdetermined and thus requiring a completion from the contextually available information through an optional top-down pragmatic process suffers from an explanatory gap.
The notion of attributive contextualism and the nature of disagreement reappears in the last contribution: "Contextualism and Disagreement" by Wang Qin. The author's objective is to demonstrate a clash between the main thesis of the approach in question entailing that "if two speakers in similar contexts make conflicting knowledge attributions, at least one of these attributions is false" and the ordinary language methodology used to substantiate it. He argues that the empirical evidence testifies to the contrary -namely that ordinary speakers do extensively disagree in similar contexts -which, as he claims, poses serious threat to the methodological validity of the contextualist approach and challenges its supremacy over its invariantist rival.
The papers collected in this issue were presented during the Second International Conference on Philosophy of Language and Linguistics, PhiLang2011, organized by the Chair of English and General Linguistics, University of Łódź in May 2011.
